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ABSTRACT
The paper presents the position that in times of Black Swan or other unforeseen or
unprecedented events the path to survival is not the sole function of the company’s strategy.
While much has been written about the need for companies to alter or adapt their strategies in
face of such events, doing so is easier said than done. In fact, strategy is foundational and a
function of and subject to the capabilities of the company. That there is no real strategy or
strategy altering approach for preparing for a Black Swan like event.
The paper provides insights and alternative view of how best companies can survive, and
even prosper in the face of such events. Rather, it is the company’s ability to reconfigure its
capabilities and resources. Utilizing the lenses of Dynamic Capabilities, Ambidexterity and
Corporate Foresight, the paper posits that when these orientations are taken in combination,
provide a company a robust approach for managing the path forward. The paper presents the
position that failing to focus on these orientations will result in the company’s inability to works
its way through the event and remain ‘stuck on the pond’ with all the swans.
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INTRODUCTION
The development of the Corona Virus (COVID-19) has had a wide-spread impact upon
most all aspects of life. The world, as most have known it, has changed significantly and in
many instances irrevocably. The breadth of these impacts and subsequent changes goes far
beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, this paper examines the impacts upon businesses and
their responses.
The rise of COVID-19 has been described by many as a Black Swan event. Black Swan
events are quite rare with a seemingly low probability of occurrence. Because these high impact
events are unpredictable, they frequently do not warrant precautionary measures. To do so
would entail operationalizing of the adage…. identify all unknown problems and plan for them!
The Black Swan idea and subsequent theory was first brought to light by quants analyst
Nassim Nicholas Taleb in his two books; Fooled by Randomness: The hidden role of chance in
life and in the markets (2005) and The Black Swan: The impact of the highly improbable
(2007). A study performed by Deloitte over a nine-year period of the 1,000 largest companies in
the world discovered approximately 380 of the firms had suffered an event described as a “Value
Killer”, or Black Swan. Such events blatantly expose a company’s biggest strategic, operational
and or financial weaknesses, triggering a cascade of negative events for the company (Abidi &
Joshi, 2017).
The multitude of events occurring in the U.S. in 2020 may arguably be identified not as
Black Swan but as a flock of Black Swans. The appearance of the COVID-19 virus, followed by
the wholesale shut down of the economy, coupled with incidents of social unrest resulting from
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police and racially fueled events, all under the umbrella of a contentious election cycle is more
than could reasonably been foreseen. All these events singularly and collectively have conspired
to wreck vast “Value Killing” impacts upon businesses, both large and small.
Much has been written about the need for companies to alter or adapt their strategies in
the face of these types of events. However, in most cases the altering of a company’s strategy is
something easier said, or written about, than done. This is not to say that a company’s strategy is
immutable. Rather, that a strategy is foundational and a function of and subject to the
capabilities of the company. In fact, if it were easy, business failure rates would not be anywhere
near where they are. The reality is that there is no real strategy or strategy altering approach for
preparing for a Black Swan event.
This paper attempts to provide insights and an alternative view of how best companies
can survive, and even prosper in a Black Swan event/environment. While applicable to most
industries and firms, it is of particular relevance to small and medium size enterprises (SMEs),
regardless of industry.
Utilizing the lenses of Dynamic Capabilities, Ambidexterity, and Corporate Foresight,
the author presents a set of overarching orientations that when taken in combination provide a
robust approach to managing for and during Black Swan type of events. The author suggests
that by focusing on this combination of orientations a firm greatly improves its odds of
surviving, and even prospering during such times, to rise like the proverbial phoenix. The author
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further posits that failing to focus on these orientations will result in a firm remaining ‘stuck on
the pond’ with the swans.1
STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES
Most work on strategy leads one to believe that while a firm’s strategy is not immutable,
it is difficult to alter quickly. The essence of a firm’s strategy lies in the activities it chooses to
perform visa vie its rivals (Porter, 1996). The research suggest that the suitability of a firm’s
strategy is the result of its fit with the organization’s and its environment contingencies (Hughes
& Morgan, 2008; Zajac, Kraatz, & Bresser, 2000) and the fit may be achieved by aligning the
firm’s strategic resources with environmental threats and opportunities facing the firm’s strategy
(Hughes & Morgan, 2008; Kraatz & Zajac, 2001). The challenge lies in the aligning of those
resources in the face of a Black Swan event.
The concept of strategy first appeared in 1960 in the business and management domains.
Chandler (1962, p. 13) posited strategy as the “determination of the basic long-term goals and
objectives of an enterprise, and the adoption of courses of action and the allocation of resources
necessary for carrying out these goals”. In 1965, Ansoff (1965) elaborated upon the concept as
“decision rules and guidelines” established by an organization ensuring orderly and profitable
growth (Malik & Naeem, 2011, p.805). At the business level, strategy is focused on how a firm
competes in each industry (Hofer, 1975). Porter (1996) presents strategy as a firm deliberately
electing a different set of activities, from other firms in its market, such as to deliver a unique
value proposition. The primary focus is how an advantage over competitors can be achieved,
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The author acknowledges the field of Crisis Management has direct implications when dealing with Black Swan
events. The author choose to focus on the strategic literature. The rational being the lenses of dynamic capabilities,
ambidexterity, and corporate foresight provide a symbiotic view for preparing an organization to weather, not only
Black swan type of events but, other forms of disruption in the organization’s environment.
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what new market opportunities can be identified or created, which new products or services
should be developed, and the extent to which the needs of the customer are met such as to
achieve the objectives of the firm (Johnson, 2002; Malik & Naeem, 2011).
The topic of how firms adapt to changes in their external environment is a continuing
topic of interest in business literature. It is no secret that many well established firms fail to adapt
effectively (Birkinshaw, Zimmermann, & Raisch, 2016) and that the current COVID-19
environment will only exasperate the failure rate. This is brought about by the fact that the
COVID-19 situation has resulted in an exceedingly rapid discontinuous external change. Such
changes require firms to reconfigure their existing ways of work and customer interactions. To
rethink their assumptions about how to succeed in their chosen market and industry (Birkinshaw
et al., 2016).
The concept of a Black Swan event is synonymous to the literature derived definition of
discontinuity. Both manifest themselves as a set of significant changes often occurring in abrupt
or discontinuous bursts” (Brooks, 1986, p.340), “a temporary or permanent, sometimes
unexpected, break in a dominant condition in society” (Van Notten, Sleegers, & van Asselt,
2005, p.180). The concept can be extended as “a specific phenomenon [COVID-19] of
behavioral dynamics, noticeable in sudden changes in the variables of an entity under
observation” and therefore, “Often associated with the terms of unsteadiness, instability,
nonlinearity or jump” (Deeg, 2009) (Ghezzi, 2013, p.1328).
Current conceptualization of an organization is an entity comprised of a bundle of
strategic resources, working in concert to provide a distinct form of competitive heterogeneity
(Barney, 1991; Camelo-Ordaz, Martıń -Alcázar, & Valle-Cabrera, 2003; Hughes & Morgan,
2008; Luo, Sivakumar, & Liu, 2005). These resources comprise both tangible and intangible
4

elements that are idiosyncratic to the firm, and are costly to imitate, heterogeneous, imperfectly
mobile, valuable, and rare (Barney, 1991; Hughes & Morgan, 2008; Hunt, 2000). Such resource
are key elements of a firm’s strategic orientation and determine the ability of the firm to compete
effectively.

Dynamic Capabilities
A firm’s strategy without the necessary resources cannot be implemented (Menon,
Bharadwaj, Adidam, & Edison, 1999). As such, the firm’s strategy cannot be changed or altered
to fit new environmental contingencies. However, strategic resources do not, unto themselves,
confer competitive advantage. It is only when these resources are deployed through a cohesive
strategy do they provide any potential for an advantage (Hunt, 2000).
Dierickx & Cool (1989) posited that the rents accruing from a particular configuration of
resources is transitory and that the firm must be adept at continuously creating new resources and
assembling them into require competences (Danneels, 2012). Pitelis & Teece (2010) postulate
that the way a firm’s resources are coordinated and managed is as important to the firm’s
survival as the resources themselves. That the capabilities of asset orchestration and market
creation or co-creation are vital to the profitable management of those resources. Many of these
capabilities become entrenched in the routines of the firm and reside with the top management
team. These organizational capabilities can be thought of as falling into two interconnected, but
separate, categories; ordinary and dynamic. Ordinary capabilities usually reside in the
operational domain whereas dynamic capabilities are more strategic (Teece, David J., 2019).
Teece, Pisano, & Shuen (1997) posit that dynamic capabilities are integral to the selection,
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development, and coordination of ordinary capabilities. How firms utilize dynamic capabilities
to create, extend, integrate, modify, and deploy their resources helps explain long-run growth
and firm survival, or failure (Teece, 2019).
Teece (2014) deconstructs dynamic capabilities into three categories: the identification
and assessment of opportunities and threats (sensing), the mobilization of resource to address
those opportunities and threats (seizing), and reconfiguring or transforming; the continuous
renewal of the firm’s resources, both tangible and intangible (Birkinshaw et al., 2016). History
has shown some firms are better than others at adopting to discontinuous changes in their
environment, as such the concept of dynamic capabilities has proven sustainable. Yet, there is
still an on-going debate regarding how dynamic capabilities present themselves in practice.
Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) posit that they are manifested in processes, e.g., new product
development or acquisitions. Teece presents the view that they manifest as ‘signature’ practices
distinctive to the firm, e.g., Toyota’s lean production system (Gratton & Ghoshal, 2005)
(Birkinshaw et al., 2016).
Ambidexterity
Another way to view and approach the issue of discontinuities, that has gained much
traction recently, is the concept of ambidexterity. Ambidexterity is defined as the organization’s
ability to address mutually conflicting demands in an effective manner. The literature
traditionally presents the conflicting demands as exploration and exploitation.
O’Reilly and Tushman (2008) posit that ambidexterity is a dynamic capability in so
much that it demonstrates the ability of a firm to simultaneously explore and exploit a variety of
capabilities thus allowing a firm to adapt over time. Birkinshaw, et al., (2015, p.42) go on to
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suggest that a firm’s “mode of adoption” is an import and often overlooked variable. They posit
that the appropriate mode of adaptation will vary with the circumstances and thus require its own
distinctive set of capabilities. It is the combination of the mode of adaptation and the associated
set of capabilities that will determine if the firm is able to adapt to the discontinuous change in its
eternal environment.
Teece, Peteraf and Leih (2016) present the view that firms with strong dynamic
capabilities are often characterized with a highly efficient entrepreneurial management teams and
robust organizational designs. Such firms can often lower the costs and risks of organizational
agility with their ability to successfully manage uncertainty. Firms exhibiting superior dynamic
capabilities will better know when to sacrifice efficiency for agility. That their ability to respond
in times of great uncertainty or to unforeseen events ala Black Swans will be superior to those
firms lacking a robust dynamic capabilities orientation.
Surviving a Black Swan like event requires management’s ability in deciding what to do
as much or more so as how to do it. U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld in an infamous
press briefing (2002) identified four categories in which decisions are made. Known-known
(certainty), known-unknown (risk), unknown-knowns (Knightian uncertainty), and unknownunknown (true uncertainty). Contrary to common belief, most decisions are not made under true
uncertainty. Many may think that Black Swan events are unknown-unknown, they would be
mistaken (Phan, Phillip H. and Wood, Geoff, 8 Oct 2020).
The real challenge is knowing what the right things are when facing a condition of
unknown unknowns. Doing the right things when confronted by a Black Swan requires more of
an entrepreneurial mindset (Teece, 2014). Black Swan events often result with existing “rules”
being altered and new “rules” being established. The ability of the firm to adapt in these
7

circumstances is paramount to their very survival. Meeting these challenges requires the ability
to redeploy the firm’s entire portfolio of asset and capabilities while balancing the interests of all
stakeholders, both in and outside of the firm. The development of these dynamic capabilities
provides the firm the ability to integrate, build and reconfigure both their internal and external
resources to meet the changes in the business environment (Teece, David & Leih, 2016).
Thereby lies part of the issue. Most all traditional or classical approaches to strategic
management and positioning presume relatively predictable environments. While they recognize
risk, they tend to ignore the impact of uncertainty. Rather, they tend to address uncertainty in
much the same manner as risk (Teece & Leih, 2016). The unfortunate outcome being that in an
attempt to preserve their source of advantage, firms can over commit to codifying and
institutionalizing their capabilities. As such, they make themselves more inert and vulnerable to
environmental changes (Worley, Williams, & Lawler III, 2014). Dynamic capabilities provide
the organization an opportunity to respond to and shape these unknown events. Such capabilities
allow a firm to detect fundamental changes in their environment at an earlier stage, thus
providing more time to react and reconfigure to the external shocks (Haarhaus & Liening,
2020).
Corporate Foresight
Teece et al. (1997) define dynamic capabilities in terms of the sensing and shaping of
new opportunities. Ramirez, Osterman & Gronquist (2013) relate the dynamic capabilities of
sensing and shaping to the functions of scanning, learning and interpretation that comprise
corporate foresight. In fact, Barreto (2010 p. 271) provides an updated definition of dynamic
capabilities: “A dynamic capability is the firm’s potential to systematically solve problems,
formed by its propensity to sense opportunities and threats, to make timely and market-orientated
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decisions, and to change its resource base.” (Schwarz, Rohrbeck, & Wach, 2019). Rohrbeck,
Battistella & Huizingh (2015) go on to define corporate foresight as:
“Corporate foresight permits an organization to lay the foundation of
future competitive advantage. Corporate foresight is identifying, observing, and
interpreting factors that induce change, determining possible organization-specific
implications, and triggering appropriate organizational responses. Corporate
foresight involves multiple stakeholders and creates value through providing
access to critical resources ahead of competition, preparing the organization for
change, and permitting the organization to steer proactively towards a desired
future.” (Rohrbeck et al., 2015, p.6).
Dynamic capabilities and corporate foresight focus on activities that aid in
predicting the future or to explore possible future states within the business environment.
They do so in order to address relevant firm capabilities to adapt to fast changes in the
environment that threaten their competitive position (dynamic capabilities) or to pre-empt
and shape it (corporate foresight) (Semke & Tiberius, 2020). Semke & Tiberius (2020)
go on to posit that dynamic capabilities and foresight both aim at the organization’s
ability to meet future challenges by renewal. That foresight can be regarded as a specific
activity corresponding with the sensing process of dynamic capabilities. However, it is
important to recognize that a strategic competitive advantage is not based on dynamic
capabilities alone. Rather, it is in using the capabilities earlier than competitors to
configure resources that provide superiority in the market (Semke & Tiberius, 2020;
Teece et al., 1997; Teece, D. J., 2007).
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Fergnani (2020) contends that corporate foresight is a firm level dynamic
capability allowing firm to evaluate and become prepared for possible future events
within the business environment. That corporate foresight can be integrated such as to
enrich and expand the dynamic capabilities of a firm. Corporate foresight provides the
additional, but often underutilized, future-orientated perspective.
Increased instability in most all aspects of commerce is of growing concern.
Disruptive and unforeseeable political events, economic downturns, and pandemics
(Black Swans) provide managerial challenges along multiple fronts. This coalescence of
volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA) has become the norm in
which most firms, large and small, find themselves in (Bennett & Lemoine, 2014a;
Bennett & Lemoine, 2014b; Fergnani, 2020). The rapidly evolving VUCA environment
weighs heavily on management confidence in their ability to plan (Bennett & Lemoine,
2014). This leads to great challenges in many aspects of the enterprise, including
restructuring, designing innovative approaches, formulating partnerships, and managing
human resources (Fergnani, 2020; Millar, Groth, & Mahon, 2018). The result being the
increasing potential reality for a systematic collapse, or doomsday (Black Swan) event.
Many contend that corporate foresight is a strategic intelligence capability that
needs to be embedded in the organization as opposed to being an episodic or externally
driven phenomenon (Ahlqvist & Kohl, 2016; Sarpong, Maclean, & Alexander, 2013).
Sarpong, et al (2011; 2016) posit that corporate foresight is social and ongoing,
something that should be practiced every day. That it is a series of micro activities
focused on negotiating the organization on a path towards the future (Sarpong et al.,
2013). In order to be successful it needs to involve constant interaction by all members
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of the organization, not just upper management, that employees are encouraged to share
and exchange views regarding emerging changes in the environment and their impact for
strategic change (Fergnani, 2020; Sarpong & Maclean, 2016).
Examination of enhancements of the resource-based view (RBV) with the
integration of the dynamic capability framework (Teece et al., 1997) demonstrates that
corporate foresight is well conceptualized as a dynamic capability. The framework’s
foundation suggests that rapidly changing business environments prevent a firm from
maintaining a competitive advantage solely with resources alone. Rather, the firm must
have the capabilities to rapidly adapt, reconfigure and recreate resources and
competences [capabilities] in a dynamic manner (Fergnani, 2020; Teece et al., 1997;
Wang & Ahmed, 2007).
Research shows that firms train their personnel, design equipment and systems,
and formulate responses aimed at addressing foreseeable risk. Yet they often judge it as
impractical or uneconomical to prepare for events beyond a certain magnitude. Some
events are so enormous that they make even the best cost-benefit plans obsolete and or
happen so fast as to overwhelm any planned responses. Kaplan, et al (2020) classified
such events as tsunami risks, after the Fukushima nuclear power plant catastrophe in
Japan. Others might well classify this and other such events as Black Swans.
The Fukushima power plant, like many other Japanese power plants had been
designed to withstand rare, or improbable events, including earthquakes and ocean waves
up to 5.7 meters in height. Unfortunately, the March 2011 earthquake produced an
unprecedented 14-meter-high tsunami that breached the plants seawall. The COVID-19
pandemic shares similar characteristics in that global outbreaks of viruses were not
11

unfamiliar. Recent events include the SARS epidemic in 2003, H5N1 “avian” flu in 2004
to 2006, and H1N1 in 2009. There was a body of experience from these events, but
COVID-19 is novel because infected people could be both asymptomatic and contagious
for extended periods of time. The result being the spread of the virus farther and faster
than most national health care systems had planned for (Kaplan, R.S., Leonard, H.R., &
Mikes, A., 2020) While these and similar events may be viewed as Black Swans, it is
apparent that they do not rise to the level of ‘true unknows’ (unknow-unknowns).
Taleb (2007) presents three scenarios for determining events as Black Swans.
First, and foremost, the event comes as a surprise to observers. He does not posit that
such events could not have been anticipated. In fact, in hindsight, they could have been
foreseen. Rather, such events come only as a surprise from the perspective of the
decision maker because of their being unschooled, inexperienced, insensitive, or simply
unconcerned; Rumsfeld’s known-unknown and unknown-knowns. Second, to be a Black
Swan an event must have a major impact on a large swath, if not all of society, they are
impactful. Third, that after the first recorded instance of the event it is rationalized in
hindsight as having been foreseeable. This is significant because in hindsight, the data
and sources of data pointing to the Black Swan event are evident (Phan, Phillip H. and
Wood, Geoff, 8 Oct 2020).
Corporate Foresight is a dynamic capability allowing a firm to facilitate how they
realize the necessary adaptation by implementing future preparedness. As such,
corporate foresight is situated as part of the dynamic capabilities’ framework. It
emphasizes the need for everchanging [dynamic] capabilities within the firm to attain
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and, more importantly, maintain competitive advantage and survival (Fergnani, 2020;
Wang & Ahmed, 2007).
Arguably, while the construct of corporate foresight may appear as novel, it does
seem to overlap with many of the elements incorporated in dynamic capabilities. Such
elements as adaptive capability, the ability to identify and exploit new market
opportunities (Wang & Ahmed, 2007); absorptive capacity, recognizing, assimilating,
and utilizing external information (Lane, Koka, & Pathak, 2006; Wang & Ahmed, 2007);
innovative capability, developing new products and processes (Wang & Ahmed, 2007);
and relational capability (Helfat et al., 2007), reconfiguring the resource base by
including resources of collaborators and acquisitions. The primary difference is that
corporate foresight focuses on the future (Fergnani, 2020).
IMPLICATIONS
The question now becomes, what does this mean for businesses, particularly
SMEs? Since the middle of March 2020, we have witnessed an unimaginable number of
business closures and failures. The initial estimates from the Current Population Survey
(CPS) of the impact of COVID-19 on U.S. business ownership for the period April –
June 2020 indicated a dramatic reduction in business activity, particularly among SMEs.
They report a reduction of 3.3 million active businesses (Fairlie, 2020). The industries
affected are varied, with retail, arts and entertainment, personal services, food services,
and hospitality experiencing the greatest impacts. Industries such as finance, professional
services, and real estate have fared better, partly because of their ability to conduct
business remotely or virtually (Bartik, A., Bertrand, M., Cullen, Z.B., Glaeser, E.L.,
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Luca, M., & Stanton, C., 2020). The factors contributing to the reduction are varied and
numerous.
In fact, a great many of these closures have no direct causation link to the current
COVID-19 pandemic. The largest segment experiencing closures during the pandemic
are the same segments that have historically had high failure rates. According to industry
reports, from such organizations as the National Restaurant Association, 60% of
restaurants fail in their first year and 80% do not make it past five years. Other segments,
such as small retail, entertainment, personal services, etc., experience similar findings.
The U.S. Small Business Administration reports that there are approximately 30 million
small businesses in the U.S. of which only 5.9 million have employees. They further
report that between 7% and 9% of those firms go out of busines every year, or that as
many as 531,000 businesses fail annually (Headd, 2018).
While the COVID19 pandemic has had a significant impact and even functioned
as an accelerant upon business closures, it is not the sole reason for the failures.
Arguably, the principal reason businesses, particularly SMEs, fail is due to a lack of
capital. This is how the pandemic has affected business failures. The pandemic has
resulted in a rapid unexpected, and therefore unplanned for, shrinkage in business
activities. First there was the nationwide lockdown in mid-April 2020 followed by many
local targeted lockdowns. The result being that the life blood for most businesses, their
cash flow, was severely constrained, if not completely shut off, and like any entity
deprived of its life blood, it dies. It is estimated that by July 2020, nearly 420,000 small
businesses have failed as a result of becoming insolvent, a number typically seen for an
entire year (Bauer, Broady, Edelberg, & O’Donnell, 2020; Hamilton, 2020).
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Another contributing factor is the impact the epidemic has had on the supply
chain for so many businesses. These challenges and even disruptions in the supply chain
have a ripple effect throughout the chain culminating with the final consumer, be it
another business or individual consumer. Supply chain disruption can lead to lost sales
and opportunity costs. However, it is interesting to note that many businesses placed
supply chain disruption as being less of a factor than reductions in overall demand and
employee health concerns (Bartik, A., Bertrand, M., Cullen, Z.B., Glaeser, E.L., Luca,
M., & Stanton, C., 2020).
The question becomes how can businesses plan or and address events such as
COVID-19 or other Black Swans? A large body of literature suggests that firms need to
adjust their strategies. However, the author suggests that simply adjusting one strategy is
neither simple nor appropriate. A firm’s strategy is a fundamental view or approach of
how a firm positions itself in its respective market. That the adjustment of a strategy
takes time to implement and that in the case of Black Swan types of events time is a
resource sorely lacking.
Black Swan events frequently create imperatives for firms to reconfigure and
transform their operations. Manufacturing firms often find that such events cause
disruption to their supply channels. Impacted firms need to become less dependent upon
a single supply channel or vendor. Rather, they need to look to omni-channels to ensure
the continual flow of required inputs to their processes. To successfully accomplish this
may require a firm to dynamically reconfigure and adapt their capabilities. Arguably, a
firm that is vigilant in seeking ways to expand / enlarge its supply channels is exhibiting
ambidextrous behavior, exploiting existing channels while simultaneously seeking
15

(exploring) new sources. While instrumental to the firm’s survival, these changes do not
necessitate an altering of the firm’s strategic orientation.
Challenges for consumer facing companies are often more multi-faceted. On one
hand, they may be experiencing difficulties sourcing many of the products or services
(inputs) necessary to support their company. While on the other hand, gaining access to
or providing for access from their customers may also be problematic. The current Black
Swan event, COVID-19, has dramatically and possibly irrevocably induced changes in
shopping behavior forever altering consumer businesses. Companies that have
traditionally relied upon actual ‘face-to-face’ contact with their customers have had to
find a way to dynamically develop or expand their capabilities in the ecommerce arena.
However, the challenges do deeper than merely adapting or adjusting to
ecommerce. Per a McKinsey (Sneader, K., & Singhal, S., 2021) survey, there is a strong
lack of brand loyalty among online buyers. Mckinsey found that only 60 percent of
consumer goods companies feel they are evenly moderately prepared to capitalize on
ecommerce opportunities. Direct-to-consumer selling requires the adoption or
development of new skills and capabilities not a revamping of strategic orientation. The
firm is still trying to sell the same products or services to the same targeted market; thus,
the strategy is the same. Rather, it is how to reach and deliver the goods (capabilities) to
the market.
The key to surviving a Black Swan event, or even just surviving in today’s
hypercompetitive environment, is the firm’s ability to adjust and reconfigure their capabilities.
That a firm’s capabilities must remain malleable with the ability to be dynamically reconfigured
to address changes, both anticipate and unanticipated, in the firm’s operating environment.
16

Strong dynamic capabilities are a requisite for fostering the agility necessary to address and
adapt to uncertainty (Teece et al., 2016).
Another facet that should be incorporated is some aspects of corporate foresight. These
anticipatory practices can contribute to a firm’s ability to adopt to new courses of action. While
no firm can predict or foresee the future with any real certainty, the practice of corporate
foresight has been shown to have a significant positive effect on the firm’s ability to see external
changes sooner and thereby act on them sooner (Schoemaker, 2019; Schwarz et al., 2019).
The last aspect needing consideration is that of ambidexterity. The ambidextrous firm is
one that successfully navigates between the conflicting demands of exploiting current
capabilities while exploring new and often untested capabilities. Such an approach allows a firm
a higher potential for successful adaptation over time.
All these approaches should be integral components of a firm’s strategic orientation. In
fact, they are foundational in the development, and more importantly, the operationalization of a
firm’s strategy. They, along with the actual capabilities, serve as how the firm conducts and
competes in its market. The capabilities of the firm are the market-facing side of the firm. It is
the how of their existence. When faced by a Black Swan or other altering event, the ability of
the firm to adjust, adapt, and realign its capabilities to meet those events will determine the
success or failure of the firm.
By way of an example, restaurants surviving the COVID-19 are not those that altered the
strategy from fine dining to casual, their strategic orientation. Rather, it is those restaurants that
could adapt their capabilities from dining in to out-side dining, take-out, and delivery dining.
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Such establishments did not alter their strategic orientation, what they did was to adjust, adapt
and alter their existing capabilities to meet the changes in their environment.
When examining the wide breadth of occurrences from the COVID-19 pandemic, we see
many business failures. However, we are also seeing many success stories. Firms that can
maintain their basic strategic orientation, but to meet and deliver on that orientation, often in new
and novel ways. They have mutated or morphed their capabilities as needed to meet the
challenge. To paraphrase James Carville’s 1992 oft quoted televised quip….’it’s the capabilities,
stupid.’
CONCLUSION
There are many ways companies can adapt or adjust their capabilities. What a firm does
and how they do it will be specific to the individual firm. How a firm responds is very much a
function of how dynamic a firm is. Their ability to dynamically alter their capabilities to explore
new approaches while simultaneously exploiting existing capabilities that are foundational to
their existing mode of conducting business. Areas to consider exploring include going digital,
adopting omni-channels, providing service in a different manner, i.e., outdoors, via delivery, in
homes, and pivoting to new products and services to name just a few.
Another possible approach is to simplify or reduce the firm’s offerings. A critical
examination of the firm’s offerings considering the new conditions, changing customer
behaviors, increasing costs may expose areas of waste and inefficiencies. Excessive variety can
easily Drive waste, mistakes, and training costs. The result being reduced employee
productivity. High variety means higher process and decision fatigue for the consumer. Often
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customers are more willing to buy if presented with fewer options (Iyengar, S. S., & Lepper, M.
R., 2000; Kalloch, S. & Ton, Z., 2021).
To summarize, a firm’s ability to react and respond to changes in their environment, be it
the result of a Black Swan or any other event, is less about its strategic orientation and more
about the capabilities of the firm. The firm’s ability to dynamically reconfigure and adapt those
capabilities to the changes in their environment is critical to the firm’s survival. This ability is
not the exclusive domain of large organizations. It needs to be practiced by firms of all size.
Arguably, it may be even more important for small firms, since they often do not have the
financial wherefore all to weather radical changes in their environment.
The ability to maintain a dynamic capabilities orientation requires the firm to also
practice in some form a degree of corporate foresight. In fact, the basic functions of the classic
SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) analysis indirectly contribute by
having the firm constantly examine its external environment [opportunities, and threats] in an
attempt to ascertain potential changes in their environment.
The ambidexterity skill set can also be achieved by the SWOT functions of examining the
firm’s strengths and weaknesses. The identification of the firm’s strengths provides insight into
capabilities of the firm that can be exploited. Capabilities that need to be maximized for the
betterment of the firm. The weaknesses identification provides insights into where the firm
needs to explore, either how to improve upon existing capabilities or to seek new ones.
The author posits that when corporate foresight and ambidexterity are taken together to
foster an environment for dynamic capabilities, the firm will increase is chances for survival
during periods of significant environmental change, disruption, and uncertainty. That such an
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orientation is more sensitive and responsive to change than the firm’s overall strategic
orientation. That while a firm’s strategic orientation is important for establishing long-term
direction, it is not malleable enough to respond and guide a firm through periods of unexpected
and rapid disruption, i.e., Black Swan events.
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